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Social Cohesion between the Member States 
of the European Union: 
Past Developments and Prospects for an Enlarged Union
REGINA BERGER-SCHMITT*
Centre for Survey Research and Methodology (ZUMA), Mannheim, 
Germany
Abstract: The economic and social cohesion of Europe constitutes a main policy goal
of the European Union. In this article a broad concept of social cohesion is proposed,
which covers two principal dimensions: in addition to disparities in living conditions,
which can be called the inequality dimension of social cohesion, social ties between
countries are another important aspect, designated in brief as the social capital di-
mension. For both dimensions empirical analyses of selected indicators are presented.
They address the question of whether the social cohesion among EU Member States
increased during the past 15 years. Furthermore, the prospects for social cohesion
within an enlarged EU are dealt with by analysing potential consequences that the ac-
cession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland implies for social cohesion. The
analyses reveal that social cohesion within the European Union did not really become
stronger during the past 15 years. The entry of the three candidate countries would
probably weaken social cohesion even further, especially owing to the limited public
approval of their accession in many Member States. Social cohesion could be strength-
ened by greater solidarity between the prosperous and the ‘backward’ countries. The
main prerequisites for this – mutual understanding, trustful relations, and a sense of
community – may be enhanced by intensifying communication and interaction among
countries. 
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 6: 721–748
1. The concept of social cohesion 
The concept of social cohesion emerged during the 1990s as a central policy goal at the
national and the supranational level. There may be several reasons for the great interest
politicians take in issues of social cohesion. First of all, the social cohesion of a society is
viewed as a condition of its political stability and security. Inequalities and divisions with-
in a society increase the risk of the political disruption and breakdown of the political sys-
tem [Council of Europe 2000]. Second, social cohesion is considered a source of wealth
and high economic performance, as has been demonstrated in several empirical research
studies [for example, Putnam 1993; Hjerppe 1999; Ritzen 2001]. It is also important for
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other aspects of welfare, such as health, education and general subjective well-being [Rose
2000; Coleman 1988, Putnam 2001]. Third, deficiencies in social cohesion, such as weak
social ties and a low level of social solidarity, may have the effect of increasing public ex-
penditure, for example through the need to provide social services which would otherwise
be performed by private networks of help and support or volunteer work.
The large degree of attention devoted to the goal of social cohesion in politics has
been accompanied by a number of scientific works on conceptual issues and empirical
questions1. A review of these works shows that the concept of social cohesion has been
used in a variety of meanings covering a multitude of aspects. At that it is not always clear
whether these aspects are considered as constituents, causes, or consequences of so-
cial cohesion – a fact which of course does nothing to reduce the equivocal nature of the
concept. 
On a general level, social cohesion may be defined as a characteristic of a society
which deals with the relations between societal units such as individuals, groups, associa-
tions, and territorial units [McCracken 1998], wherein different kinds of relations are the
focus of interest. There have been various efforts to identify the dimensions of social co-
hesion and thus to contribute to a conceptual clarification [Jenson 1998, O’Connor 1998;
Woolley 1998]. A review of this work reveals a rather high level of agreement on the key
aspects of the concept of social cohesion, which may be subsumed under two main head-
ings. As I have discussed elsewhere [Berger-Schmitt 2000, 2002b], I distinguish between
two principal dimensions of social cohesion:
(1) The first dimension can be shortly denoted as the inequality dimension. It covers all
aspects of the distribution of welfare in a society: issues of equal opportunities among
different population groups, the extent of disparities and social cleavages, and the
amount of social exclusion and discrimination
(2) The second dimension can be shortly denoted as the social capital dimension. It em-
braces all aspects which are generally considered as constituting the social capital of
a society: social ties that bind, in terms of social contacts, shared values and norms,
trust in other people and in societal institutions, feelings of solidarity, a sense of be-
longing to the same community and a common identity.
Alongside the distinction between the two dimensions incorporated in the concept
of social cohesion, I suggest a differentiation be made between two levels of reference: a
national and an international level. On the national level, inequalities and social ties with-
in societies are of interest, while on the international level inequalities and social ties be-
tween societies are concerned. The present article is confined to this second perspective in
dealing with the social cohesion between European countries. 
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Beauvais/Jenson [2002] provide a good overview.
2. Social cohesion among European countries
The economic and social cohesion of Europe has constituted a main policy goal of the
European Union for several years, first declared in the Treaty on European Union in 1993
and repeatedly confirmed in many policy documents [e.g. European Commission 1997,
1998, 2000]. At the Lisbon Summit of the European Council in March 2000, the
European Union’s goal for the next decade was described as becoming “the most compet-
itive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable eco-
nomic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” [European Council
2000, p. 2]. In subsequent meetings of the European Council2 the strengthening of social
cohesion was emphasised as one of the most important European policy concerns, too. 
The significance of this policy goal also becomes evident in the demand for a Report
on Economic and Social Cohesion in Europe every three years which was formulated in
the Treaty on European Union. The second report, published in 2001, deals like the first
report with the extent of the disparities among European countries and regions with re-
spect to selected aspects of living conditions, e.g. gross domestic product per capita, pover-
ty, employment and unemployment, education, and infrastructure. The reports thus con-
centrate exclusively on those aspects of economic and social cohesion which I attribute to
the inequality dimension. In my view, this is too narrow a perspective, which overlooks oth-
er very important issues of the social cohesion among European countries that I have tried
to describe by using the term ‘social capital dimension’: social ties among countries in
terms of contacts and relations among their peoples, agreement in basic values, feelings of
belonging to a common community or the emergence of a common European identity. 
This article will address both dimensions of social cohesion. In particular, two main
questions will be investigated:
• Has social cohesion among the member states of the European Union increased, that
is, have disparities in living conditions diminished and social ties among countries in-
creased? With respect to each dimension of social cohesion the development of se-
lected indicators from the middle of the 1980s until the end of the 1990s will be
analysed for the EU Member States. 
• What changes to social cohesion can be expected from the eastward enlargement of
the European Union? The large economic gaps between existing Member States and
candidate countries are well known, but what about inequalities in other welfare com-
ponents? And what are social ties between people from applicant countries and peo-
ple from current EU Member States like? These issues will be examined by consider-
ing actual data on the EU countries and three applicants for membership – the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland – with respect to a selection of welfare indicators from
different domains of life , as well as indicators of social ties.
Regina Berger-Schmitt: Social Cohesion between the Member States of the European Union
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2 Especially the meetings in Nice, December 2000; Laeken, December 2001, Barcelona, March
2002.
2.1 The development of social cohesion among the Member States 
of the European Union
2.1.1 The development of disparities in living conditions 
With regard to the question of whether living conditions in different EU Member States
have become more similar over time an analysis was made of the developments of more
than 20 indicators from several domains of life (Table 1). For each indicator, data from
the middle of the 1980s, the early 1990s, and the end of the 1990s was compiled3. With
respect to the first and the last points of measurement, Table 1 shows the figures for the
country with the best situation, for the level reached by the country with the worst situa-
tion, expressed as a percentage of the best situation, and for the average level of all coun-
tries compared to the best one (overall disparity). 
For the majority of the indicators, the Nordic countries, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands prove to be the countries with the best situation, while most of the Southern
European countries – Portugal, Spain, and Greece – along with Ireland are the Member
States with the worst situation. This is especially true with respect to indicators of materi-
al wealth, education, employment, health, and social protection, while in reference to
transport and environmental conditions the results are not uniform and no unique leading
or lagging countries are indicated. There are no fundamental differences between the mid-
dle of the 1980s and the end of the 1990s in terms of the countries offering the most and
the least favourable living conditions, but the size of the discrepancies between the top and
the bottom indicator values has clearly diminished in many cases. However, the overall dis-
parity of living conditions in the European Union considerably decreased in only 7 of the
22 indicators and even markedly increased in 7 other indicators. A reduction in disparities
can be observed in all life domains with the exception of health, where the differences
among countries have mostly widened. 
A comprehensive picture of the development of the relative level of welfare in the in-
dividual Member States can be gained by adding up the index values of all indicators and
computing the average value for each country and point of measurement. This compre-
hensive welfare index has an upper limit of 100, which is reached when a country is on top
with respect to all 22 indicators. The results are displayed in Figure 1, which reveals that
at the end of the 1990s the overall differences in living conditions among EU Member
States are nearly as large as about 15 years ago, and most of the countries have maintained
their relative levels of welfare. The highest level of welfare can be observed in Sweden, even
though the gap in relation to the other countries has somewhat diminished. This is espe-
cially due to a relative decrease in the level of material wealth and an increase in unem-
ployment in comparison with other European countries. The next welfare positions are oc-
cupied by Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Austria, which are characterised
by relative improvements in living conditions. Finland, Germany, France, and Belgium
show in comparison a medium and unchanged level of welfare. At the end of the 1990s the
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 6
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3 Depending on the indicator the data is from 1985, 1986 or 1987 respectively 1991, 1992 or 1993
respectively 1997, 1998 or 1999.
United Kingdom is in a medium position, too, but the level of welfare has increased com-
paratively during the past 15 years, owing to relative improvements within the domains of
education, employment and environment. Furthermore, as a result of positive develop-
ments in wealth, education, employment and social protection, Portugal has notably ad-
vanced. In contrast, the relative levels of welfare in Spain and in Ireland rose only slight-
ly, and Greece has hardly reduced the gap between it and the countries offering the most
favourable living conditions. Thus little progress has been made so far in achieving the goal
of converging living conditions in the European Union.
2.1.2 The development of social ties 
Disparities of living conditions in the Member States of the European Union represent on-
ly one dimension through which advances in social cohesion and European integration
can be measured. As explained above, another equally significant dimension is the
strength of social ties among people.
An important precondition for enhancing social relations, interactions and under-
standing between people from different countries is that of language skills. Being able to
speak English, as the most widely known language, is especially useful for communication
between people. Table 2 shows that the percentage of people who speak English well
enough to take part in a conversation rose in all countries between 1987 and 1999. At the
top of the ranking of countries are the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, where in 1999
more than three quarters of the population was able to speak English. In Luxembourg,
Finland, and Austria the English language is widespread among about one-half of the pop-
ulation. By contrast, in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France, English is spoken by only a mi-
nority, at less than one-third of the population, although compared to 12 years ago con-
siderable improvements have taken place in these countries, too. 
If one takes into account the major European languages other than English –
German, French, Spanish and Italian – the results are similar. The percentage of people
who speak at least one of these five languages in addition to their mother tongue has in-
creased in most of the countries. In 1999 this skill was highest in Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, where at least twice as many people as in Spain,
Portugal, France, or Italy are able to converse in a foreign language. However, by far the
least knowledge of foreign languages can be found among the English and the Irish, who
obviously rely on the English proficiency of other people.
Therefore, as measured by their language abilities, the chances of developing rela-
tions with people from other European countries are rather good for the Dutch, the
Luxembourgers, the Scandinavians and the Austrians, but rather poor in Spain, Portugal,
France, and Italy. 
Information about the actual relations among people from different European coun-
tries is based on the indicator of trust in other people. Mutual trust is considered to rep-
resent an important base for the development of a ‘sense of community’ [Deutsch et al.
1957, p. 36]. It is a prerequisite for establishing long-term co-operation between coun-
Regina Berger-Schmitt: Social Cohesion between the Member States of the European Union
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tries [Follesdal 2001; Gabriel 1999]. Thus, it is crucial for strengthening the social cohe-
sion between European countries and promoting European integration. 
In 19964 the extent of trust in people from other EU countries was highest in the
Scandinavian countries and in the Netherlands (Figure 2). These countries, as well as
Luxembourg and Austria, are at the same time also the Member States of the EU which
are most trusted by people from other countries. By contrast, all Southern European peo-
ple not only express rather little trust towards other Europeans but are also rated low with
respect to their own trustworthiness5. These results confirm earlier studies which revealed
a correlation between the economic power of a country and the degree of trust it is as-
cribed with [Inglehart 1991]. Furthermore, the assumption stands to reason that trust be-
tween people of different nationalities is fostered by language skills, which facilitate com-
munication and therefore enhance the opportunities of getting to know foreign people6.
In comparison with 1990 mutual trust among all Europeans somewhat decreased,
but the decline is very pronounced with respect to the level of trust expressed by people in
Portugal and Greece. In 1996, these two countries indicated by far the lowest degree of
trust in other people, a result which is also confirmed by other Eurobarometer surveys con-
ducted in 1997 using a differently worded question [Berger-Schmitt 2002a]. Possible rea-
sons for the relative distrust of Southern European people, especially the Portuguese and
the Greeks, may be their relatively low level of welfare compared to other countries of the
European Union7. But despite this it can be held that social cohesion between European
countries as measured by the indicator of trust did not increase within the period under
consideration.
The extent of social cohesion in Europe can be evaluated not only by indicators of
social relations between countries but also by indicators of ties between the individual
countries and the larger collective they belong to, such as, for example, identification with
Europe. The formation of a common European identity among citizens is an important
political objective, which has been mentioned explicitly in the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. The identification of people with Europe and
with the goals of European unification is crucial for the progress of European integration.
Since political decisions at the level of the European Union affect more and more the per-
sonal living conditions of citizens, public support of European policy makers and the will-
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 6
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4 This is the most recent data from the Eurobarometer which are comparable to data collected
earlier, first in 1990. Before 1990 and in 1997 trust to people from other countries was measured by
two other versions of the question. After 1997, the question about trust was not asked anymore.
5 It should be noted that the level of trust among the Southern European countries is not higher than
between Southern European and Central or North European countries of the EU.
6 By means of Eurobarometer 44.0 conducted in 1995 it is possible to analyze the relation between
knowledge of foreign languages and trust in people from other countries at the microdata level. The
results show positive correlations between English proficiency and trust as well as between the
abilities to converse in a particular language and trust in people from the respective country. 
7 This hypothesis is supported by the positive correlation between trust and life satisfaction at the
individual level.
ingness of citizens to co-operate are required [Münch 1999]. In this context, identification
with Europe is considered to serve as a source of legitimisation for political decisions
[Pfetsch 1998; Reese-Schäfer 1999]. Furthermore, especially with respect to the reduction
of welfare disparities and financial equalisation between prosperous and poorer Member
States a consciousness of belonging together and solidarity among people are required
[Armingeon 1999; Habermas 1998; Lepsius 1997]. A European citizenship was intro-
duced with the Treaty on European Union, also aimed at promoting the development of
a sense of community and a common European identity among citizens [Follesdal 2001;
Garcia 1997].
However, until now people’s identification with Europe is not very strong and has
not been rising significantly over the years. This can be documented for most of the EU
Member States by the figures below (Table 3). In 1999 identification with Europe was es-
pecially weak in the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries, and Ireland. Further-
more, the two countries with the lowest degree of trust in people from other countries –
Portugal and Greece – also felt a low level of affiliation with Europe, which has moreover
been significantly declining since 1992. In contrast, the citizens of Luxembourg, Italy, and
Spain have related to Europe to a rather high extent for many years. 
The reasons for this mostly weak European identity are probably complex and differ
in the individual countries. For example, the scepticism of the United Kingdom and the
Scandinavian countries towards European integration is well known and is founded on a
fear of a loss of autonomy and other negative effects of EU membership. But there may be
other, more general reasons for the overwhelmingly low degree of identification with
Europe. In the scientific discussion of this issue at least two arguments can be found. First,
the democratic deficiency of the European Union, that is, the poor possibilities citizens
have for influencing EU decision-making and the lack of transparency in the policy-mak-
ing process, has been considered as detracting from the formation of a European identity
among citizens. If people are only weakly involved in the political life of the European
Union their awareness of a European common welfare and their loyalty towards EU insti-
tutions will hardly be encouraged [Habermas 1994, 1998; Garcia 1997; Hörnlein 2000]8.
Second, the internal heterogeneity of Europe, that is, the disparities in living conditions,
the lack of a common European culture, the diversity of languages and a divergence of val-
ues are deemed to constitute obstacles to the formation of a common European identity
[Lepsius 1997; Fossum 2001; Immerfall 1997, Münch 1999]. 
2.2 The impact of the enlargement of the European Union on its social cohesion
If – according to the latter argument – the emergence of a European identity and a sense
of community were hampered by the heterogeneity of the European Union, the accession
of Central and Eastern European countries would further undermine social cohesion in
Regina Berger-Schmitt: Social Cohesion between the Member States of the European Union
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8 In response to these concerns the democratic legitimacy of EU decisions has been enhanced
insofar as the power of the European Parliament was extended by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
two ways: on the one hand by widening disparities in living conditions, and on the other
hand by the impact of an increasing heterogencity on the sense of community.
In the next section, disparities in living conditions between the current EU Member
States and three of the countries from the first group that is to join the EU, namely the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, will first be examined on the basis of the latest
available data. The significance of EU enlargement for its social cohesion will then be eval-
uated with respect to the quality of social ties both between countries and to the European
Union as a whole. 
2.2.1 Disparities of living conditions between EU Member States and candidate countries 
Analyses of the disparities between the EU Member States and the candidate countries
have usually concentrated on economic indicators, and it is a well-known fact that there is
a large economic gap between the current EU Member States and the applicant countries
from Central and Eastern Europe. This discrepancy has proved to be even wider than in
the case of previous enlargements, as has been demonstrated in comparisons of per capi-
ta GDP [Weise et al. 2001; Delhey 2001; Amato/Batt 1999]. It seems obvious that a con-
vergence of income levels and the standard of living can only be reached by strong finan-
cial support from the EU and will require a substantial amount of time.
However, in view of the goal of strengthening economic and social cohesion the im-
pact of enlargement on cohesion within the European Union should be analysed in a more
comprehensive way. Indicators of welfare covering further life domains have to be includ-
ed in assessing the extent of disparities of living conditions between EU Member States
and candidate countries. This has been done in the following analyses of 26 indicators
from several life domains similar to those considered in Table 1. For each of these indica-
tors the EU country with the best situation and the relative positions of the ‘worst’ EU
country and of the three candidate countries included are shown (Table 4). In addition,
the total disparity across all EU countries is indicated, as well as the prospective disparity
following the entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the EU. 
First of all, the results confirm the wide discrepancies between EU Member States
and applicants for membership with respect to indicators of wealth. The three candidate
countries included clearly range below the least prosperous EU country, and the disparity
in wealth within the EU would markedly increase if they were part of it. This is true with
the exception of one indicator – the motorisation rate – which is higher in the Czech
Republic than in the EU country with the lowest level of economic development – Greece.
The Czech Republic also performs with respect to many other indicators better than
Hungary or Poland. It is well known that it belongs to the most prosperous countries of
the first wave of accessions, behind Cyprus and Slovenia.
Enlargement of the EU would also widen disparities in living conditions with respect
to the availability of modern communication technologies. However, it should be noticed
that the use of PCs and the Internet is more widespread in the Czech Republic than in
Greece – the country at the bottom end in the range of EU countries. Also, in Hungary
and in Poland, PCs are no less available than in Greece.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 6
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As for the indicators of all other life domains – education, employment, health, so-
cial protection, transport and environment – the inclusion of the three applicant countries
into the EU would overwhelmingly result in only a slight increase of disparities or no in-
crease at all. Furthermore, it should be emphasised that for most of these welfare indica-
tors at least one of the candidate countries – and in many cases all of them – ranks high-
er than the EU country with the lowest performance level. There are some very large gaps
to the disadvantage of the respective EU country with the least favourable situation, for ex-
ample in the education level, the labour force participation of women, the ratio of physi-
cians to inhabitants, the density of the railway network, the frequency of road accidents in-
volving personal injury, and carbon dioxide emissions. A few indicators even show one of
the candidate countries in a better position than the country in the lead within the EU: for
example, the Czech Republic has the highest percentage of population aged 45–49 years
with at least upper secondary education and has the most dense railway network.
An overall measure of welfare for each country was calculated in the same way as
was done in Figure 1. This comprehensive welfare index, with a theoretical upper limit of
100, has a value of 53 in the Czech Republic and a value of 51 in Hungary and in Greece.
Thus, the overall level of welfare in the Czech Republic and in Hungary is about as high
as in Greece – the EU country offering the poorest living conditions – whereas Poland,
with a mean index value of 47, compares rather badly. 
These results show that it is important to differentiate between the candidate coun-
tries in assessing the consequences of EU enlargement on its economic and social cohe-
sion. Measured against overall disparities of welfare the entry of the Czech Republic and
Hungary into the EU will scarcely weaken its internal social cohesion. That these coun-
tries are lagging behind with respect to the level of wealth is set off by their relatively good
positions in other important life domains. However, this cannot be held to be true for
Poland and would be probably even less true for other applicants, especially those from
the second group, such as Romania or Bulgaria.
2.2.2 Quality of social ties between EU Member States and candidate countries
Enlargement of the European Union may also change its overall social cohesion in terms
of the kind of social ties which exist between the current Member States and the candidate
countries. In considering these ties one can distinguish between the relations of the
prospective to the present EU Member States and the European Union as a whole on the
one hand, and, conversely, the relations of the EU Member States to the applicant coun-
tries on the other hand9. In the following section, first of all some indicators of people’s
relations to the European Union will be analysed, focusing on the candidate countries
compared with the Member States. These indicators include identification with Europe
and feelings of belonging, attitudes towards the country’s membership in the European
Regina Berger-Schmitt: Social Cohesion between the Member States of the European Union
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of social ties within an enlarged European Union, but this aspect will be left out of consideration
here. 
Union and trust in the European Union. Subsequently, some indicators of the relations of
current EU citizens to applicant countries will be investigated, specifically the extent of
trust in people from candidate countries and attitudes towards their entry into the EU. 
However, before analysing mutual relationships between EU Member States and ap-
plicants for membership, in correspondence with section 2.1, it is worth taking a look at
language skills as a significant factor for the development of social ties with foreign peo-
ple. Among the candidate countries included in this investigation, knowledge of the
English language is most widespread in the Czech Republic. In 2001, 24% of the Czechs
were able to take part in an English conversation, compared to 21% of the Poles and only
14% of the Hungarians10. In most of the EU Member States the corresponding percentages
of people are considerably higher11. However, in the Czech Republic, English language
skills are better developed than in Spain (18%) and Portugal (22%). Moreover, in each of
the three candidate countries the percentage of people speaking English has nearly dou-
bled within the last five years. In 1996, only 7% of Hungarians, 12% of Poles, and 12.5%
of Czechs were able to converse in English12. Comparatively good language skills in the
Czech Republic can also be found with respect to other foreign languages. In 2001, the per-
centage of people who could speak – in addition to their mother tongue – at least one of
the five major European languages (French, Italian, Spanish, German or English) reached
45% in the Czech Republic, a figure which was higher than in many EU Member States.
For example, only 19% of the British, 23% of the Spanish, 33% of the Portuguese and 40%
of the Greek people had a similar knowledge of foreign languages. In Poland and in
Hungary, one-third and one-quarter of the population respectively possessed these lan-
guage skills. Thus especially in the Czech Republic the preconditions for developing social
relations and ties to people from EU countries are rather good or at least not worse than
in some of the current Member States. 
The actual attachment of the candidate countries to Europe as a whole can be as-
sessed by means of several indicators (Table 5). In total they reveal that in the candidate
countries feelings of belonging and identification with Europe are pronounced at least to
the same extent as in the EU Member States. In 1995, the percentage of people who felt
close to Europe was higher in each of the candidate countries than in any EU Member
State. Especially in Hungary and in the Czech Republic, with percentages of 94% and 79%,
a considerably larger part of the population than in the European Union felt close ties to
Europe. A rather strong identification of people from candidate countries with Europe is
also confirmed by more recent data from the year 2001. The data show for example that
overwhelming majorities of Hungarians, Poles and Czechs are proud to be Europeans. In
all EU Member States this is true to a lesser extent. Furthermore, the percentage of peo-
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results of the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer conducted in 2001 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/
public_opinion/cceb_en.htm).
11 According to the data of Eurobarometer 55.1, 2001.
12 These figures result from data of the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer conducted in the years
1990–1997.
ple in the candidate countries considering themselves not or not exclusively as nationals
of their country but also as citizens of Europe exceeds that in many of the EU Member
States. 
In comparison with feelings towards Europe, attitudes towards the European Union
reflect a less strong attachment. However, in all applicant countries the majority of the
population think of the entry of their country in a positive way. In comparison with the
views of the Member States on their membership in the EU, the percentage of people in
the applicant countries considering membership as a ‘good thing’ is on a medium level.
Another indicator of people’s relations to the European Union – trust in the European
Union – results in similar findings. As in most of the Member States the majority of the
population of the candidate countries tends to trust the European Union. The extent of
trust is especially high in Hungary, where 71 % of the population tend to trust it. Only in
Luxembourg is this figure even higher. Also, with respect to nearly all of the other indica-
tors considered, Hungary proved to be the candidate country with the strongest attach-
ment to Europe and to the European Union. 
As far as the relations of the EU Member States to the countries applying for mem-
bership are concerned, two kinds of indicators are available: the extent of trust in people
from applicant countries and approval of their entry into the European Union. Trust as an
important precondition for developing good relationships to other countries is decisive for
the question of social cohesion in Europe. If the current EU Member States had a lower
level of trust in the candidate countries than in each other, enlargement of the EU would
certainly lower its social cohesion. Data from the year 1996 indeed show that people from
all EU countries at that time trusted citizens from other Member States rather than na-
tionals of the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland (Figure 3). Favourable judgements of
the candidate countries were made in the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom,
Ireland and the Netherlands, where trust on the whole prevailed. By way of contrast, peo-
ple from all other EU Member States expressed distrust more often than trust. The lowest
levels of trust in applicant countries can be found in Portugal, Germany, Austria, Italy,
Luxembourg, and Belgium. Compared to their positive ratings of EU countries, Germans
and Austrians especially were rather distrustful of the applicant countries, while citizens
of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Greece showed the least differences in the assess-
ments between future and current EU Member States. The vast majority of the EU coun-
tries barely differentiated between candidate countries. Only Finland, Germany and
Austria indicated somewhat more positive feelings towards Hungary than towards the
Czech Republic or Poland. 
It is important to note that in comparison with 1990 trust in the candidate countries
declined in nearly all EU countries13. This had also been observed with respect to trust in
other EU Member States, but in that case the decrease of trust was less pronounced. The
result is quite surprising, since one would rather expect an increase of trust in the candi-
date countries in view of their political transformation and their application for EU mem-
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13 In 1990 the mean ratings on the scale of distrust by the then 12 EU Member States amounted to
2,4 for Czechoslovakia as well as for Hungary and Poland. In 1996 the mean ratings of the same EU
Member States amounted to 2,7 for each candidate country.
bership. If one had to interpret this result as indicating a tendency of EU citizens to dis-
sociate from eastward enlargement of the EU, this would be a negative finding with respect
to future social cohesion within the EU. 
There are more recent data which show the actual degree of approval of an enlarge-
ment of the EU (Table 6). Approval of enlargement to include the applicants considered
here is highest in Sweden, where nearly three quarters of the population are in favour of
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland becoming part of the European Union. Also, in
Denmark and in Greece the mass of the population has a positive view of the entry of
these countries into the EU, and somewhat more than half of the population in Spain,
Italy, Finland, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg support their accession. In all other EU
Member States advocates of enlargement make up a minority. By far the lowest percent-
age of people in favour of accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland can be
found in France. This is the only country where there are many more opponents than ad-
vocates with respect to each applicant for accession. The United Kingdom and Belgium al-
so show a rather low extent of support for enlargement. The majority of Austrians are
against the entry of the Czech Republic and Poland, but would approve of Hungary join-
ing the European Union. Similar attitudes can be found in Germany, where people most-
ly approve of the accession of Hungary but not of the Czech Republic or Poland. Also, the
Finnish population support the entry of Hungary to a larger extent than in the case of the
other two countries. Austria’s, Germany’s and Finland’s rather positive rating of Hungary
compared to other candidate countries was also observed with respect to the level of trust
in these countries. In the remaining EU Member States people make few distinctions be-
tween their attitudes towards the three countries. 
Thus, all things considered, there is only limited support of eastward enlargement of
the EU. This becomes particularly evident in view of the overwhelming approval the entry
of countries like Switzerland or Norway would meet with. While about three quarters of
all citizens of the EU would vote in favour of the entry of these countries, less than half of
the population would be in favour of the Czech Republic or Poland. There is no EU coun-
try which would not prefer Switzerland or Norway over the Czech Republic, Hungary or
Poland as future Member States, but the contrasts in rates of approval are especially strong
in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and France. Worries over potential financial disadvantages
as well as rising unemployment and fears of a decrease in importance of their own nations
are among the most common reasons for this reluctance towards enlargement, as further
analyses of the data reveal. Moreover, there is no evidence that younger generations are
stronger advocates of enlargement than middle-aged or elderly people, so the prospects for
social cohesion within an enlarged European Union are rather poor considering the atti-
tudes of current towards future Member States. 
On the other hand it should be noted that a lack of approval of enlargement does
not necessarily mean disapproval, as considerable parts of the population did not form any
opinion on this issue. Only about a third of the EU’s population are explicit opponents to
the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland, while about a fifth feels unable
to make a judgement. Further analyses prove that attitudes towards enlargement strongly
depend on the amount of information people have on this issue. While among EU citizens
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who feel very well informed about enlargement there are overwhelming majorities in
favour of the entry of the Czech Republic (76%), Hungary (77%) and Poland (65%) and
only about 5 % are undecided, less than a third of people who do not feel informed at all
advocate the accession of these countries and about a third are undecided. Thus, there is
a guarded hope that support for enlargement could be increased in the future through bet-
ter information among the public.
3. Summary and conclusions
The economic and social cohesion of Europe constitutes a main policy goal of the
European Union. It is usually conceived as a reduction of disparities in living conditions
between European countries and regions. However, in this article a broader concept of so-
cial cohesion has been proposed. It is argued that the concept of social cohesion covers
two principal dimensions. In addition to disparities of living conditions, which can be
called the inequality dimension of social cohesion, social ties between countries are an-
other important aspect, designated here as the social capital dimension.
Analyses of the development of social cohesion within the European Union revealed
that not much progress has been made during the past 15 years. At the end of the 1990s
overall disparities in living conditions between EU Member States were nearly as large as
about 15 years ago, with Sweden at the top and Greece at the very bottom of the hierar-
chy of countries. Also, social ties, as measured by trust between nations and identification
with Europe, showed hardly any increase in strength.
The prospects for social cohesion within an enlarged European Union are even
worse, but this is not so much a result of widening disparities in living conditions, at least
as far as the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland is concerned. In-
equality will primarily rise with respect to the level of wealth, but not with respect to many
other welfare aspects which in the candidate countries mentioned here are mostly on at
least the same level as in the EU countries in the worst situation. Social cohesion within
an enlarged European Union will not be diminished by any weak social ties of the candi-
date countries to Europe either, since the sense of attachment to Europe and to the
European Union is at least as strong as in the Member States. But social cohesion will be
endangered by the relative distrust towards people from candidate countries and the low
level of approval for their accession to the European Union among the populations of
many Member States. 
So the question arises of how social cohesion among countries can be strengthened,
even in an enlarged European Union. Of course, a multitude of factors must be taken in-
to account and there is no simple answer to this question. At this point some notes on the
potential mutual dependence of the two dimensions of social cohesion should be given in
order to point out that measures to promote one dimension may also improve the other. 
On the one hand it should be taken into consideration that disparities in living con-
ditions may detract from feelings of belonging together. People from countries with com-
paratively poor living conditions may feel excluded from the high level of welfare in other
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countries and therefore cannot view themselves as a part of this community. Thus the
sense of attachment to the European Union and the emergence of a European identity
could possibly move forward through relative improvements to the living conditions in dis-
advantaged countries. 
On the other hand an upgrade of living conditions in backward countries depends to
a certain degree on the solidarity of the other Member States, especially their willingness
to provide financial support. This presupposes mutual understanding, trustful relations and
a sense of community which – according to Karl W. Deutsch’s theory of integration – could
be enhanced by increasing communication and interaction among countries [Deutsch et al.
1957]. Of course, knowledge of foreign languages is an important prerequisite for this.
Improvements in the amount of information on other countries could also contribute to the
development of trust and understanding between them. As far as the relations of EU citi-
zens to the candidate countries are concerned more information on the enlargement of the
EU and its benefits even for the current Member States is needed. An awareness of the in-
terrelation between different aspects of social cohesion is crucial to any political measures
aimed at strengthening overall social cohesion in the current as well as in an enlarged EU. 
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Table 1. Selected indicators of living conditions – disparities between                         
Notes and sources: 
(a) Indicator value of the
country with the worst situa-
tion in % of the indicator val-
ue of the country with the
best situation; in case of indi-
cators 3, 10, 11, 13, 18–21 it
is the indicator value of the
country with the best situa-
tion in % of the indicator val-
ue of the country with the
worst situation; (b) mean of
the indicator values of all
countries in % of the best sit-
uation; the lower this mean




(2) Federal Statistical Office
of Germany, Statistisches









(6) OECD, Education at
a Glance; (7) Pupils and stu-
dents in upper secondary or
tertiary education in % of the




Statistical Yearbook; (8) Eurostat, Labour Force Survey; (9) (10) A, FIN, S: OECD, Labour Force
Statistics 1979–1999; otherwise: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey; (11) (12) (17) (19) (21) European
Commission, Statistical Yearbook; (13) (18) (20) WHO, Health For All Database; (14) OECD, OECD
Health Data 2001; (15) 1985: OECD, OECD Health Data 2001; otherwise: European Commission,
Statistical Yearbook; (16) OECD, Social Expenditure Database (22) European Commission,
Eurobarometer Surveys; percentage of respondents who have “not very much reason” or “no reason at
all” to complain with respect to all of the following environmental problems: quality of drinking water,
noise, air pollution, waste disposal, damage done to the landscape.
 
Material Wealth 
1)  Gross Domestic Product per capita at 1990 Prices and PPS  
2)  Private Consumption Expenditure per capita at 1990 Prices and PPS 
3)  Share of Expenditure for Food, Beverages and Tobacco (%) 
4)  Television Receivers per 1000 Inhabitants 
5)  Passenger cars per 1000 Inhabitants 
Education 
6)  Public Expenditure on Education as a Percentage of GDP 
7)  Participation in Upper Secondary or Tertiary Education (%) 
8)  Population aged 45-49 y. with at least Upper Secondary Education (%) 
Employment 
9)  Labour Force Participation of Women (%) 
10) Unemployment Rate (%) 
Health 
11) Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000) 
12) Life Expectancy of Men at Birth (in years) 
13) Consumption of Cigarettes per Year and Person aged 15 years+ 
14) Practising Physicians per 1000 Inhabitants 
Social Protection 
15) Share of Public Social Protection Expenditure in GDP (%) 
16) Public Social Protection Expenditure per capita at 1995 Prices and PPS 
Transport 
17) Length of Railway Net per 1000 square km (in km) 
18) Persons Injured in Road Accidents per 100.000 Inhabitants 
Environment 
19) Carbon Dioxide Emissions per capita (t) 
20) Sulphur Dioxide Emissions per capita (kg) 
21) Gross Domestic Consumption of Primary Energy per capita (toe) 
22) Population with Few Environmental Problems (%) 
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EU Member States 1985/87 and 1997/99
Country with best situation  Country with worst situation  Total Disparityb 
1985/87  1997/99  1985/87  1997/99  1985/87 1997/99 
country value country value country % of besta country % of best % % 
          
L 19902 L 25795 P 37,6 GR 36 63,2 59,1 
L 10627 L 14014 P 40,6 P 48,1 65,9 63 
NL 16,8 D 13,9 IRL 42,1 IRL 45,6 67 73,3 
DK 523 FIN 594 P 34 GR 38,6 69,4 75,9 
S 458 L 572 GR 27,7 GR 44,4 68 70,7 
          
S 7 DK 8,3 E 51,4 GR 42,2 74,2 64,1 
B 58,7 UK 88,2 P 36,9 IRL 54 73,4 73,3 
D 69,7 D 81,6 E 15,4 P 20,4 55 68,3 
          
S 78,5 DK 76,1 E 42,9 IRL 59,9 65,5 78,1 
L 2,6 L 2,4 E 12,2 E 15,1 37,5 36 
          
FIN 6,3 S 2,9 P 35,4 GR 49,2 69,1 62,2 
S, GR 74 S 76,9 L 94,1 P 93,2 97 96,9 
NL 1333 S 867 GR 36,8 GR 25,8 62,2 49,4 
I 3,8 I 5,8 UK 36,8 UK 29,3 63,5 55,4 
          
S 31,1 S 33,3 P 37,3 IRL 48,3 74,9 79,4 
DK 5570 L 8146 P 19,7 P 32,4 69,2 64,3 
          
B 119 B 110 FIN 14,6 FIN 15,8 48 49,9 
FIN 206 DK 183 A 25,5 B 25,8 54,7 51,2 
          
P 2,8 P 4,8 L 10,4 L 23,6 38,7 58,3 
NL 17,8 S 5,8 FIN 22,8 GR 11,4 50,2 39,1 
P 1 P 2,3 L 11,9 L 28 35,5 59,9 
DK 74 DK 60,3 IRL 33,8 GR 30,5 62,5 61,8 
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Table 2. Knowledge of foreign languagesa (in %)
 English English, French, Italian, Spanish 
or  Portuguese 
 1987 1999 1987 1999 
Austria   51  54 
Belgium 30 42 74 57 
Germany 35 41 37 43 
Denmark 52 76 59 81 
Spain 9 17 18 23 
France 20 30 31 36 
Finland  51  52 
Greece 25 39 32 42 
Italy 11 28 23 40 
Ireland   12 16 
Luxembourg 40 53 99 89 
Netherlands 60 78 71 85 
Portugal 13 23 24 36 
Sweden  77  79 
UK   25 14 
a) Percentage of the population who speak a foreign language 
well enough to take part in a conversation 
Source: Eurobarometer 28, 1987 and  52, 1999.
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Table 3. Identification with Europe (in %)
 1987 1992a 1992b 1999 
Austria    52 
Belgium 48 56 61 58 
Denmark 56 38 58 51 
Germany 42 52 51 44 
Spain 62 61 64 67 
France 53 53 69 60 
Finland    38 
Greece 55 61 61 40 
Italy 51 58 74 73 
Ireland 39 37 47 45 
Luxembourg 65 64 72 76 
Netherlands 34 42 58 56 
Portugal 57 66 61 47 
Sweden    38 
UK 34 31 44 31 
a) Question 1987 and 1992a: ‘Do you ever think of yourself as not only (nationality) but also as
European? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?’ The percentage of respondents answering 
‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ is indicated. Question 1992b and 1999: In the near future do you see yourself 
as ... (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality), European only?’
The percentage of respondents choosing one of the last three answers is indicated.
Source: Eurobarometer 27, 1987; 37, 1992; 52, 1999.
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Table 4. Disparity of living conditions between EU Member States                                   
Notes and sources:
a) The ratios are calcu-
lated in such a way that
the higher is the value
the better is the situa-
tion;  b) mean of the
indicator values of all
countries in % of the
best situation; the lower































(19) (24) (26) WHO,
Health For All
Database; (20) (21) OECD, Social Expenditure Database; (22) (23) Eurostat, Statistics in
Focus 4/2002; (25) 1998 or latest available year; OECD, Environmental Data Compendium
 
Material Wealth 
1) GDP per Head in PPS at Current Prices, 2000 
2) Private Consumption Expenditure/Head at Current Prices and PPS, 1999 
3) Share of Expenditure for Food, Beverages and Tobacco (%), 1997 
4) Passenger cars per 1000 Inhabitants, 1999 
Communication Technology 
5) Mobile Telephone Subscribers  per 100 Inhabitants, 2000 
6) PCs per 100 Inhabitants, 2000 
7) Internet Users per 100 Inhabitants, 2000 
Education 
8) Expenditure per Student in Secondary Education in PPPs, 1998 
9) Participation in Upper Secondary or Tertiary Education (%), 1998/99 
10) Population aged 45-49 y. with at least Upper Secondary Education (%), 2000 
11) Ratio of Pupils to Teaching Staff in Primary Education, 1999 
12) Reading Literacy of Pupils Aged 15 Years, 2000 
Employment 
13) Labour Force Participation of Women (%), 2000 
14) Unemployment Rate (%), 2000 
Health 
15) Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000), 2000 
16) Life Expectancy of Men at Birth (in years), 1999 
17) Practising Physicians per 1000 Inhabitants, 2000 
18) Alcohol Consumption in Litres per Person aged 15 Years+, 2000 
19) Consumption of Cigarettes per Year and Person aged 15 Years+, 1999 
Social Protection 
20) Share of Public Social Protection Expenditure in GDP (%), 1998 
21) Public Social Protection Exp./Head at 1995 Prices and PPS (US$), 1997 
Transport 
22) Length of Railway Net per 1000 square km (in km), 1999 
23) Length of Motorways per 1000 square km (in km), 1999 
24) Persons Killed or Injured in Road Accidents per 100.000 Inhabitants, 1999 
Environment 
25) Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Head (t), 1998  
26) Sulphur Dioxide Emissions per Head (kg), 1998 
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            and candidate countries






% of besta in % of EU Member State with 
best  situationa 
EU EU+ 
CZ, H, PL 
         
L 44300 GR 35,2 29,8 26,0 20,1 54,6 49,7 
L 17232 P 60,2 41,9 34,1 33,2 75,0 68,6 
D 13,9 IRL 45,6 48,1 42,8 35,8 75,0 69,6 
L 590 GR 43,1 56,8 40,3 40,7 71,2 67,0 
         
A 77 F 64,1 54,8 39,9 22,7 84,6 77,0 
S 50,7 GR 14 24,0 17,2 13,6 61,1 53,9 
S 45,6 GR 20,8 21,3 15,6 15,8 55,6 49,3 
         
A 8163 GR 40,3 39,0 26,2 17,6 68,3 61,1 
S 93,1 P 53,7 44,4 59,5 70,7 72,2 69,7 
0 D 82,6 P 20,1 100,6 87,7 96,6 71,1 75,1 
DK 10,6 UK 47,1 45,3 101,9  70,0 70,5 
FIN 546 L 80,8 90,1 87,9 87,7 91,3 90,8 
         
S 76,4 I 60,6 83,4 69,0 78,4 80,5 79,9 
L 2,4 E 17,3 27,3 37,5 14,6 44,2 41,3 
         
S 3,4 GR 55,7 82,9 37,0 42,0 70,2 67,5 
S 77 P 93,5 92,7 86,1 89,4 97,0 95,8 
GR 4,4 UK 40,9 70,5 72,7 50,0 76,2 74,2 
S 6,2 L 41,6 52,5 55,9 72,9 60,1 60,1 
S 867 GR 25,6 39,0 30,3 28,7 49,4 46,6 
         
S 31 IRL 50,9 62,7  73,7 79,0 77,7 
L 8071 P 33,8 31,3  22,0 65,7 61,1 
         
B 110 FIN 15,8 108,9 74,7 66,6 49,9 55,4 
NL 57,6 IRL 2,4 11,0 8,4 1,5 36,4 31,5 
FIN 183,6 B 25,7 52,2 71,2 94,4 51,8 55,3 
         
P 5,4 L 32,1 46,2 94,7 65,1 63,7 64,5 
S 5,5 GR 10,8 12,9 9,5 11,3 40,7 35,8 
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Table 5. Attachment to Europe and to the European Union (in %)











Trust in EUe 
 1995 2001 2001 2001 2001 
Austria 68 76 53 46 45 
Belgium  67 53 62 61 
Germany 58 56 59 59 48 
Denmark  77 59 63 54 
Spain 62 80 61 61 66 
France  71 65 52 55 
Finland  64 40 38 46 
Greece  60 42 70 70 
Italy 68 82 68 69 65 
Ireland 44 81 44 83 63 
Luxembourg  76 77 82 73 
Netherlands 54 69 54 77 62 
Portugal  77 48 67 69 
Sweden 39 76 49 44 42 
UK 22f 55 28 38 31 
      
Czech Republic 79 85 59 54 54 
Hungary 94 93 50 66 71 
Poland 70 87 65 57 55 
a) Question: ‘How close do you feel to (continent)?’  very close, close, not very close, not close at all;
b) Question: ‘And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be
European?’ c) Question: ‘In the near future do you see yourself as ... (nationality) only, (nationality) and
European, European and (nationality), European only?’ The percentage of respondents choosing one of
the last three answers is indicated. d) Question: ‘Generally speaking do you think that (our country’s)
membership of the European Union is (would be) a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad?’;
e) Percentage of respondents who tend to trust the EU vs. tend not to trust it/ don’t know; f) Great
Britain. 
Source: International Social Survey Programme 1995; Eurobarometer 56.2, 2001; Candidate Countries

















Table 6. Approval of the enlargement of the European Union on the part of the current Member Statesa
 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Switzerland Norway 
 for against for against for against for against for against 
 in % 
Austria 37 51 65 27 34 54 83 10 81 11 
Belgium 44 44 48 38 48 40 79 14 80 13 
Germany 46 38 57 29 42 44 82 9 81 10 
Denmark 66 26 66 26 72 22 89 8 91 6 
Spain 53 18 53 19 53 19 71 8 68 9 
France 28 53 33 50 36 48 66 25 64 26 
Finland 53 28 60 23 49 31 80 8 84 6 
Greece 63 22 66 21 65 23 83 8 79 11 
Italy 49 30 55 26 54 28 79 9 79 11 
Ireland 47 20 48 19 50 19 71 6 70 7 
Luxembourg 54 31 52 32 50 36 81 11 82 8 
Netherlands 51 32 53 31 53 31 84 9 84 8 
Portugal 49 23 48 24 50 24 68 12 62 16 
Sweden 72 16 73 15 75 15 87 7 89 6 
UK 40 31 42 30 45 30 66 16 66 15 
           
EU15 45 34 50 30 47 34 75 13 74 13 
a) Question: ‘For each of the following countries would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in
the future?’









































































Figure 2. Mean level of distrust towards other EU Member States and own trustworthinessa
















distrust expressed towards other countries distrust expressed by other countries
a) Question: I would like to ask you about how much trust you have in people from various countries? Response Scale: 1 = a lot of trust, 
2 = some trust, 3 = not very much trust, 4 = No trust at all; the figure indicates the mean rating made by each EU Member State with re-
spect to the other 14 countries and the unweighted mean rating received from them. 
















8 Figure 3. Mean level of distrust
a towards other EU Member States and candidate countries











EU countries CZ H PL
a) Question: s. Figure 2.
Source: Eurobarometer 46.0, 1996.
